PANEL THREE: GENERAL DISCUSSION
John Broderick
I would like to address my question, if it is a question, to Ambassador Kampelman. First, I would like to say, Ambassador, the
United States is indeed honored to have a person like yourself with
your background, your experience, and your articulateness and
perspicacity representing it and doing the excellent job you are doing. Secondly, you mentioned that change is inevitable. The
French have a saying that everything changes, but everything remains the same. I would like your opinion as to what change, if
any, you see if death comes to Mr. Brezhnev and the other members of the Politburo within the next year or two. How will that
affect everything that you have said and everything we stand for in
the distinctions you have made between the two forms of
government?
Max M. Kampelman
First, let me thank you for your comments, and then let me say I
do not know the answer to your question. We would like to believe
that the succeeding leadership will be less ideological, more pragmatic, and more willing to face the realities of the world, and
therefore, more willing to try to work out an accomodation with
the West. In Madrid, where there is a large Soviet delegation
headed by an ideologue, there are some very capable younger deputies. There is no pattern in the secondary leadership of that delegation. There are some who give signs of repeating their fathers,
and there are others who give signs of being more hopeful and outgoing from our point of view. In my discussions with them, and
over the last 18 months I have had about 170 hours of private discussions with them, I have stated to them that I certainly cannot,
from my exposure to them, communicate any sense of confidence
that the change in leadership will necessarily be for the better. But
I do not know.
Jordan Paust
I would like to address this question to Paul Szasz and Justice
Newman. I understand from both of your comments that you agree
that violations of fundamental human rights and the precept of
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self-determination negate the argument that internal conflicts are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a single nation state.
But might there be different thresholds with regard to different
types of intervention?
Paul C. Szasz
Once one has decided that a human rights violation constitutes a
matter of international concern, then the reaction must be considered separately. It is really a matter for purely political decision by
the competent organs, of which there are more and more. We have
the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council as
principal organs. We also have the Human Rights Commission,
which has a sort of standing mandate. Under many of the individual treaties, such as the International Racial Discrimination
Treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, and the Civil and Political Rights Convention,
special committees have been set up to monitor violations. But, of
course, they only apply to the states that are parties to them. The
functions of the General Assembly or Economic and Social Council, on the other hand, apply to all states, whether or not they are a
party to a particular convention. So to repeat, having established
that a human rights violation is of international concern, what to
do about such violations depends on all these particular organs,
and depends on exactly which convention is being violated. Generalizations at this stage are impossible.
Frank Newman
I was delighted to learn from Mr. Szasz that he decided way
back in 1955 that article 2(7) did not cover the situation illuminated and illustrated by various kinds of human rights violations. I
think it would be a mistake to read degrees of wrongdoing into
article 2(7). It is very important that those degrees be specified in
certain provisions dealing with human rights. For example, under
resolution 1503 of the Economic and Social Council, the phrase
used is "consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations
of human rights," and that is a good phrase. It keeps a lot of junk
off of the agenda. But what I have observed since I have been
working with these groups is that the whole approach has changed.
There is a ritual, and sometimes now even the ritual is not followed. Beginning with the Chile case and the decision in August of
1974 that the subcommission could move in, every time a government was ittacked by the subcommission its representatives would
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get up and deny everything you say. But, once the ritual was over,
the people would get down to business and discuss the facts; this is
where it all begins, you have to have the facts.
G.I.A.D. Draper
Is it possible, because of the difficulty when discussing questions
like human rights with the Soviets at Madrid, that in a way the
two proponents are discussing the matter in a language which is
completely alien to the other, possibly not even understood? If one
works out the basic premises from which the Soviet Union took off
in 1917 in relation to international law, I think much of their attitude becomes clear. For many years the Soviet Union was the sole
communist state in a world of bourgeois states, the only one. When
one looks at the letters that passed between Lenin and Marx, one
is amazed at the total lack of attention that those two worthies,
one so impractical that he could not keep a laundry book and the
other running a successful business in England, paid to the law. It
was Lenin, indeed Lenin, who had the percipience to realize that
the Bolshevik state of the future would have to have a posture in
relation to law, and up it came, law as the tool of exploitation of
one class by another. Because that struggle with the proletariat is
still going on, they still need law in the Soviet Union.
There is certainly no shortage of law in the Soviet Union. But in
my student days, in 1936, there came a most remarkable development in a certain province in the south of the U.S.S.R. The region
proclaimed that the moment had come when law was no longer
necessary. They abolished the law courts, they got rid of all the
lawyers, they repealed their whole code of civil and criminal law.
All was going splendidly; they had reached the goal. Exploitation
was over; the workers' class was triumphant. All power to the
workers. Law was unnecessary. The very chilling reply from Moscow was to lock up at once all those responsible for the nonsense.
Now, when it came to consider international law, I would venture to suggest that the Soviet Union jurists were caught with their
juridical clothing in disarray. Namely, they had no prepared posture as to how to deal with their formulation of law as a tool of
exploitation by one class of another. How do we fit that to the
question of the relationship between states, of which the Soviet
Union found itself the latest, and the only communist state in a
world of bourgeois states? That world of bourgeios states had
evolved, particularly in the European matrix, the whole system of
classic international law, a large part of which was customary and
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the slightly smaller part of which was treaty law. This put the Soviet Union at an enormous ideological disadvantage. They saw at
once that they had had no hand in the molding of that customary,
and therefore bourgeois, international law.
Treaties were another matter. The Soviet Union was prepared to
embrace treaties with love and affection, because you do not go
into a treaty you do not like. You can negotiate to get your workers' Soviet ideology into the treaty, or you do not join it. But custom was tough; you brought it before you arrived. It came with you
in the cradle with your mother's milk, and it was bourgeois milk at
that. This was their predicament. You can see when you trace the
history of their international law theoreticians, that they wandered
around the 360 degrees of the clock to find a resting spot where
they could argue international law with the bourgeois world. For
you see, how can you talk of exploitation of one class by another in
the context of relationships between states that are governed by
international law norms, when these norms are the modus for exploitation? In other words they fouled their own ideological nest,
and this has taken them quite a time to sort out. Now they know
better. When it comes to the forum, and the immediate context of
human rights, such as the Helsinki Act of 1975, you find the Soviet
Union advancing the former type of theoretical argument.
I think there may be some merit in the Soviet/non-Soviet dialogue that divides the world. So far this dialogue has been concerned with international law, and more specifically, that part of it
which we call the regime of human rights, whether universal or regional. The Soviets take a stance which is based on an attitude
that we have not yet mastered, and it might be easier to refute
their stance if we had. By definition, the Soviet state is composed
of people's ministers. The government is the people's government.
How then can the people have rights against the people's government? On top of that is the whole doctrine of sovereignty which
the Soviets press to the outer limits. How many hours have we
spent in diplomatic conferences listening to the Soviets arguing the
implications of sovereignty in eliminating things like the use of the
protecting power in international armed conflicts? We have almost,
some of us with tears in our eyes, begged them to come into the
20th century of international law and kick clear the traces of the
age of Dickens, whom they read with such avidity. Come out of the
19th century we beg them, and think with us, and try to be modern. Their reply is that the so-called sphere of human rights, what
goes on inside the Soviet Union between the people and the peo-
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pie's government, is nonsense, because the ministers are the people's ministers. If the basis of human rights is people's rights, how
can the people have rights against themselves? Away with it. How
dare you interfere with what goes on inside the Soviet Union! That
is a question of sovereignty. If you were a state which was the only
Bolshevik state in a world of bourgeois states, you too would press
sovereignty until almost its snapping point. It is that attitude
which I suggest we study and try to refute.
Max M. Kampelman
The essence of your position, as I understand it Colonel Draper,
is very valid. It is a question of whether we understand each other
as we talk, whether the words we use mean the same thing, particularly in the area of human rights and international obligations.
That is the very question. With respect to the question of human
rights, it is clear that the Soviets emphasize the right to economic
advantages, the right to a job. They use the term right to life. We
think in terms of political rights. They understand what we mean;
they just do not agree with what we say. At Madrid we have discussed these differing concepts of rights. Surprisingly to many,
they have already informally agreed to a proposal that we made to
them, that if and when Madrid should end, prior to the next review meeting we would have a conference in which we discuss the
very question of our differing philosophies of human rights. I do
think that with repetition by us and insistence by us, we will develop a concept of shame as Justice Newman pointed out. We can
get their attention. This is, after all, what this process is all about.
Waldermar A. Solf
I would like to jump in and support Colonel Draper's point of
view. I spent 15 years in Germany, largely at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, and I saw how little the Americans know about
the Germans. I am, to my satisfaction, reliably informed that the
two leading American professors on the Soviet legal system cannot
sit down and discuss any Russian legal question comfortably with a
Soviet expert because they do not know enough Russian. I think
Colonel Draper was suggesting that seventy-eight hours or 278
hours of discussion someplace does not give enough understanding
of that system to enable us to bargain as effectively with them as
we ought to. Whether we want to set up an academy of peace and
pay one million or one billion dollars instead of 200 billion for military purposes, I do not know. But my experience has shown re-
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peatedly that there has been complete misunderstanding between
two such close allies as the United States and West Germany. If
this is true, then I imagine we must have much greater misunderstandings between countries like the United States and the
U.S.S.R. Some way is urgently needed to obtain better communications with the Soviets, and it would be worth whatever it costs.
Martin Feinrider
Ambassador Kampelman, I listened with interest as you described the obstacles to peace which the Helsinki process faces as a
result of the Soviet leadership's building of a ponderous military
machine, being frozen by ideological rigidity, and its belief that the
very existence of the other side is incompatible with international
peace and security. Unfortunately, I believe the present United
States administration has these same shortcomings. We have two
superpowers that very often act the same and have identical perceptions of each other.
I note that this colloquium has primarily considered internal
conflicts in terms of United States foreign policy, although to some
extent with regard to the international relations framework. But,
with the exception of Mr. McCarthy, we have essentially ignored
the positive substantive rules of international law, such as those
provided by the European Convention on Human Rights, the
American Convention on Human Rights, the O.A.S. Charter provisions that provide competence to the Inter-American Commission,
and the International Covenant. All of these have been or soon
may be relevant to internal conflict. I want to ask you why it is
that the current administration decided, after the imposition of
martial law in Poland, to cite Helsinki rather than the International Covenant, since in the latter Poland confessed that its
human rights are a matter of international concern and that it is
bound in terms of limiting derogation?
Max M. Kampelman
Let me start by saying that I was appointed by President Carter
and reappointed by President Reagan, and I am a Democrat. But I
find it very difficult to accept a conclusion that the behavior of this
Administration in any way can be compared to the behavior of the
Soviet's totalitarian society. To tie in with a comment made earlier, it is correct that we could all understand each other more than
we do now. This is an extremely difficult problem, this problem of
understanding. I know Democrats who do not understand Republi-
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cans, and Republicans who do not understand Democrats. We will
strengthen ourselves as a society by understanding each other better, and we will strengthen the international community by understanding each other better. But that should not make us immobile,
it should not make us neutral where values are concerned and
where vital distinctions exist. There are vital distinctions between
Soviet society and behavior and American society and behavior. I
think the world understands this. I know the people of Eastern
Europe understand this, the people of Western Europe understand
this, and we must understand it, even though we may be critical of
what we sometimes see in this country under any administration.
Even as we criticize ourselves, which is a healthy part of our democracy, it is vital that we not lose sight of these important distinctions. The Helsinki Final Act, the Helsinki process, and the
Madrid meeting are designed to do something about this misunderstanding. It takes a long time to achieve understanding, and in
dealing with the Soviet Union you can never be quite certain
whether they understand you or not. I have a feeling we understand them a little better than they understand us because we
study their system in our universities. We make an effort to understand their system and their language. And I hope, and as I observe this I believe it to be the case, that as we study their system
we try to do so in a sense as scholars and not necessarily as propagandists, which is not necessarily the case on the other side.
The end question that you asked was why did President Reagan,
in dealing with and in commenting on the Polish crisis, highlight
the Helsinki violation and not the stronger basis in law which exists in the other agreements that both we and they have signed. I
wish that he had used these other agreements as well as the Helsinki agreements. Let me say why I think he did not. I have now
been in Europe for two years., I have traveled a great deal through
Western Europe and talked a great deal with diplomats and people
involved with public opinion, and it is my perception that since the
Madrid meetings began, the Helsinki Final Act has somehow taken
on a new coloration. It certainly has taken on a new coloration in
this country because people who were prepared to dismiss it as irrelevant, or to suggest that we abandon it because of Soviet violations, are now ready to go ahead and use it as an instrumentality. I
think the reason is that public opinion in Western Europe looks at
this as an extremely important document now. It reflects human
rights values; it is a place where East talks to West and, to the
extent that we talk to each other, they hope we will not be shoot-
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ing at each other. It has assumed an importance that it did not
have a few years ago. From a political point of view, the President
decided that he was going to try to use this political weapon by
referring to it as having been violated, particularly since these actions in Poland took place while the Madrid meeting was going on.
I will conclude by saying further in support of my statement on
dialogue that when we deal with the Soviet Union, we must remember that their computer is fed all of the messages we give
them. We do not know how it is translated, but when it has an
effect, if it should have an effect, we will suddenly hear about it.
Let me give you an illustration. We spent a great deal of time arguing about a military question. A position that the West advanced was thoroughly dismissed and attacked by the Soviets and
their colleagues in Madrid as disrespectful and wrong, as violating
the spirit of the Final Act, and as counter-productive. Then one
day Brezhnev made a speech and made a concession to us. The
Soviet delegation was certainly not aware of this concession two
days before when they made a statement saying how terrible we
were to advance this proposal. But suddenly, out of the blue, that
computer worked out a change of position for Moscow, and
Brezhnev made a speech to us. There was no advance notice. We
were surprised by it, I know they were surprised by it, and we
could not have predicted it. So we have to keep on with our
messages about human rights. We have to talk to them. We have
to add the element of shame. We have to explain our views. We
have to assert our concerns over and over and over again, in the
hope that at some point we may hear that the computer has come
out with something which may be more hopeful to us. I would not
like us to be immobilized merely because of the complexity of the
problem. I would not like us to be silent about this merely because
we do not have the full understanding of them, or they of us.

